Unsafe Havens
U.S. money market funds have invested $11 billion in subprime
debt, much of it managed by Bear Stearns.
By David Evans
Bloomberg Markets October 2007
Money market funds were invented 37 years ago to offer investors
better returns than bank savings accounts while providing a high
degree of safety. Most of the $2.5 trillion sitting in these
funds is invested in such assets as U.S. Treasury bills,
certificates of deposit and short-term commercial debt.
Unlike bank accounts, money market funds aren't insured by the
federal government. They almost never fail.
Unbeknownst to most investors, some of the largest money market
funds today are putting part of their cash into one of the
riskiest debt investments in the world: collateralized debt
obligations backed by subprime mortgage loans.
CDOs are packages of bonds and loans, and almost half of all
CDOs sold in the U.S. in 2006 contained subprime debt, according
to a March report by Moody's Investors Service.
U.S. money market funds run by Bank of America Corp., Credit
Suisse Group, Fidelity Investments and Morgan Stanley held more
than $6 billion of CDOs with subprime debt in June, according to
fund managers and filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. Money market funds with total assets of $300 billion
have invested in subprime debt this year.
The danger of owning even highly rated CDOs containing subprime
loans was thrown into sharp relief in June, when two Bear
Stearns Cos. hedge funds that were holding subprime CDOs
collapsed.
At the center of that storm was Ralph Cioffi, a senior managing
director at Bear Stearns who ran the hedge funds. Cioffi, 51,
wore another, less publicized hat. He managed more than $13
billion of CDOs, according to Fitch Ratings -- and money market
funds and other investors bought all of it.
Cioffi-managed CDOs filled with subprime debt have been
purchased by money market funds run by Invesco Plc's AIM
Investment Service, Marsh & McLennan Cos.' Putnam Investments
and Wells Fargo & Co.
In August, New York-based Bear Stearns fired Warren Spector, the
firm's co-president for fixed income and asset management.
Cioffi stayed with the bank. Bear Stearns spokesman Russell
Sherman says Cioffi's stewardship of the bank's CDOs ended in
late June.
"There is a team of portfolio managers running them now,"
Sherman says. "Ralph still serves as an adviser." Cioffi didn't
respond to telephone and e-mail requests for comment.
Under SEC rules, money market managers must invest in securities
with "minimal credit risks." Joseph Mason, a finance professor
at Drexel University in Philadelphia and a former economist at
the U.S. Treasury Department, says subprime debt in money market
funds is far from safe.
"This creates tremendous risk for today's money market
investors," says Mason, who wrote an 84-page report on CDOs this
year. "Right now, I'm not comfortable investing anything in
CDOs."
Global financial markets were rocked in July and August, first
by the collapse of the Bear Stearns hedge funds and then when
banks and insurance companies worldwide disclosed their U.S.
subprime debt holdings.
On Aug. 9, BNP Paribas SA, France's biggest bank by market
value, froze withdrawals on three investment funds with assets
of 2 billion euros because the bank couldn't find a way to value
its U.S. subprime bonds and other assets. CDOs aren't bought and
sold on exchanges and their trading has little transparency.
During the first two weeks in August, central banks in Europe,
Japan and Australia and the U.S. Federal Reserve lent more than
$300 billion to banks to stem a collapse in credit markets.
On Friday, the Federal Reserve lowered the interest rate it
charges to banks to 5.75 percent from 6.25 percent in an attempt
to contain the subprime mortgage collapse.
Money market funds have become a staple for investors. There are
38.4 million money market fund accounts in the U.S., according
to the Investment Company Institute.
People use a money market both to hold savings and serve as an
account to buy securities and place the proceeds of sales. Bruce
Bent, who in 1970 created the first money market fund, The
Reserve Fund, says no money market fund should invest in
subprime debt.
"It's inappropriate," Bent, 70, says. "It doesn't have a place
in money market funds. When I created the first money market
fund, I said you have to have immediate liquidity, safety and a
reasonable rate of return. You also have to have a situation
where you're not giving people headline risk."
Investors have sought safety during the subprime meltdown by
moving their holdings to U.S. Treasuries and money market funds.
On Aug. 8, just after the Bear Stearns hedge funds filed for
bankruptcy protection, U.S. money market fund total assets
reached a record high of $2.66 trillion, with investors pouring
$49 billion into such funds in one week, according to the ICI.
As a sign of stability, money market funds never allow their
share price to rise above or fall under $1 for each dollar
invested.
A money market fund that invests in subprime debt increases the
risk that its share price could drop below $1. If 5 percent of a
fund's holding is subprime debt, and in a worst-case situation
that asset collapses, then the value of the fund could drop to
95 cents.
Even if a fund's value dropped below a dollar, banks and fund
companies wouldn't allow investors to lose money, says Peter
Crane, founder of Crane Data LLC, the Westborough,
Massachusetts-based publisher of the Money Fund Intelligence
Newsletter.
"Fund companies will support the funds," he says. "They won't
let them break $1 a share. The odds of money market funds
breaking the buck are virtually nil."
Just once has a money market fund failed. In 1994, a fund run by
Community Bankers Mutual Fund of Denver invested in securities
that defaulted. Investors were paid 96 cents a share, and the
fund was liquidated.
The fund had invested 27.5 percent of its assets in adjustable-
rate securities, whose values were tied to interest rate
changes, the SEC found. The fund lost money as interest rates
increased.
Until recently, CDOs had been the fastest-growing debt market --
outpacing corporate and municipal bond sales by dollar total --
with about $500 billion sold in 2006, up from $99 billion in
2003, according to Morgan Stanley.
About a quarter of the content of all CDOs sold last year in the
U.S. was made up of securitized subprime mortgage loans. CDO
sales slumped to $11.9 billion in July from $36.9 billion in
June, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox told Congress in June his agency
was conducting about a dozen probes related to the marketing of
subprime CDOs to investors.
Lynn Turner, chief accountant of the SEC from 1998 to 2001, says
the SEC will likely look into money market funds investing in
CDOs, particularly because the value of subprime collateral of
CDOs can collapse suddenly.
"I'm betting some people at the SEC will be concerned," he says.
"And they'll be more concerned in six months. How quickly did
the Bear Stearns hedge fund evaporate?"
Each time a bank or financial firm creates a CDO, it forms a
free-standing company incorporated offshore, usually in the
Cayman Islands, which doesn't tax corporations. All CDOs have a
trustee, usually a bank, that prepares monthly reports on the
changing contents of the debt package.
The trail that connects subprime debt to money market funds
usually starts with a mortgage broker who makes a loan to a
homebuyer with poor credit. A middleman then bundles hundreds of
these subprime mortgages into so-called asset-backed securities.
Next, a CDO manager buys hundreds of these securities for
collateral for a CDO. Some CDOs issue commercial paper, and
brokers can then sell that paper to money market funds.
Commercial paper, which is typically issued by banks and large
companies, is debt maturing in less than 270 days.
Commercial paper pays relatively low interest rates, which
averaged about 5.3 percent in June and July, because it rarely
defaults. There have been occasional exceptions, such as paper
issued by Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc., both of which filed for
bankruptcy earlier in this decade.
CDO commercial paper, often loaded with subprime debt, pays
higher returns than corporate paper, and it paid as much as 6.5
percent in August.
This year, CDOs have sold more than $11 billion in the form of
investment-grade commercial paper to money market funds, SEC
filings show. The paper has the highest credit rating because
Fitch Ratings, Moody's and S&P give AAA or Aaa ratings to the
top portions of CDOs, which are the source of all CDO commercial
paper.
Satyajit Das, a former Citigroup Inc. banker and author of 10
books on debt analysis, says those ratings are very misleading.
"I don't think the typical money market investor, in his wildest
dreams, would assume he has exposure to the risk of subprime
CDOs," he says. "They may be in for an unpleasant surprise."
Money market managers buy CDO commercial paper even when
prospectuses warn of the risks.
Zurich-based Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley in New York and San
Francisco-based Wells Fargo are among money market managers that
poured more than $1 billion into commercial paper issued by the
Buckingham series of CDOs managed by Chicago-based Deerfield
Capital Management LLC.
"Reliable sources of statistical information do not exist with
respect to the default rates for many of the types of collateral
debt securities eligible to be purchased by the Issuer," say
both the 2005 and 2006 CDO prospectuses backing commercial paper
held in the funds.
Deerfield's three Buckingham CDOs have directed $1.5 billion, or
40 percent of their $3.8 billion in assets, into subprime debt,
according to their trustee reports. Billionaire Nelson Peltz's
Triarc Cos. agreed to sell Deerfield in April.
Morgan Stanley spokesman Mark Lake and Wells Fargo's John Roehm
declined to comment.
Tim Wilson, head of Credit Suisse's cash management portfolio
desk, says he's comfortable with CDO commercial paper because it
has the highest credit ratings and because his funds hold the
debt for only one to three months.
"We don't have any concerns these are going to have any defaults
in 90 days," he says. "We're obviously watching." The paper
matures within three months, and after that the fund doesn't
hold any subprime debt, unless Wilson decides to buy more.
Vanguard Group Inc., the second-largest mutual fund company in
the U.S., has a policy of never buying CDO commercial paper for
its $90 billion in money market funds or $325 billion in fixed-
income mutual funds.
"It really gets down to transparency questions," says John
Hollyer, risk management director at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania-
based Vanguard. "Can you understand what you have? And can you
measure it appropriately? We haven't been comfortable that we
could."
Bank of New York Mellon Corp.'s Dreyfus unit has banned CDO
commercial paper from its $110 billion in money market funds
because it has found that analyzing subprime holdings in CDOs is
too difficult.
The firm's money market investment committee decided in 2005
that such paper was too risky, Dreyfus spokeswoman Patrice
Kozlowski says. "The committee questioned the fundamental
structure of commercial paper of CDOs," she says. Dreyfus has
never purchased CDO commercial paper, she says.
CDOs create what is supposed to be a safety net for buyers of
their commercial paper. CDO managers reach agreements with banks
to purchase their paper when nobody else will, so the CDO can
pay off debt when it's due.
Some fund companies, including Dreyfus, say those contracts
don't reassure them because they're conditional and they aren't
guarantees. "The banks can refuse to fund," Kozlowski says.
CDO paper has other risks, former banker Das says. "CDO
commercial paper has a lot more moving parts than other kinds of
commercial paper," says Das, who wrote "Traders, Guns & Money:
Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives" (FT
Prentice Hall, 2006).
"There's a lot more that can go wrong," he says. Das says that
because so much subprime debt is held by CDOs, there is constant
risk that the value of the investment can drop or collapse.
The Credit Suisse Group Institutional Money Market Fund Prime
Portfolio held 8 percent of its $22.8 billion of assets in
commercial paper secured by subprime home loans as of June 30.
Fund manager Wilson says he's not worried about the $1.8 billion
in subprime content because the term of the debt is so short.
"Lots of clients are uncomfortable owning commercial paper with
`CDO' in the name," Wilson says.
He monitors his CDO holdings by analyzing the monthly reports
that CDO trustees publish, listing all holdings. "I think there
are some investors not doing the work and relying on ratings,"
Wilson says."If you're willing to do the work, it's there."
Credit rating companies don't just rate CDOs; they play an
active role in assembling them, says Charles Calomiris, the
Henry Kaufman professor of financial institutions at Columbia
University in New York. Fitch, Moody's and S&P participate in
every level of packaging a CDO, says Calomiris, who has worked
as a consultant for UBS AG, Bank of America and Citigroup.
A CDO manager gathers hundreds of loan securitizations or bonds
to use as collateral for the CDO. The debt supports an
assortment of CDO sections, ranging from the riskiest non-
investment grade to AAA or Aaa rated. CDO managers consult with
analysts from the rating companies when creating a CDO,
negotiating the highest credit ratings for each level, or
tranche.
Most of the dollar value of all CDOs, as much as 90 percent,
gets a credit rating of AAA or Aaa. The higher the credit
rating, the lower the return that's demanded by investors. The
CDO commercial paper bought by money market funds always has a
top credit rating, even when it's backed by subprime debt.
In the past three years, Fitch, Moody's and S&P have made more
money from evaluating structured finance -- which includes CDOs
and asset-backed securities -- than from rating anything else,
including corporate or municipal bonds, according to their
financial reports.
The companies charge as much as three times more to rate CDOs
than to analyze bonds, their cost listings show. The three
rating companies say these fees are higher because CDOs are so
complex.
The close working relationships between CDO managers and rating
companies -- and the fees that change hands -- mean money market
funds shouldn't rely on ratings to evaluate CDOs, says Harvey
Pitt, who was SEC chairman from 2001 to 2003.
Pitt says fund managers should do their own research on CDOs by
reading the hundreds of pages of prospectuses and the monthly
trustee reports. Some managers may not have been doing their
homework.
"Relying on rating agencies for investment advice is dicey," he
says. "Their reliance on rating agencies left them a day late
and several dollars short."
Two money market funds run by AIM have gotten the message. They
stopped buying CDO commercial paper. "In today's market, you
really can't trust any ratings," says Lu Ann Katz, AIM's
director of cash management research.
As recently as June, two AIM money market funds owned $2.64
billion of CDO commercial paper that was invested in subprime
debt. The debt made up 10.2 percent of the AIM STIT-Liquid
Assets Portfolio and 4.5 percent of AIM STIT-STIC Prime
Portfolio.
Katz says she's stopped buying CDO investments because she
doesn't trust credit ratings and she thinks CDO paper in money
market funds is too risky. AIM's funds had included more than $1
billion of CDO commercial paper issued by CDOs managed by Bear
Stearns before its hedge funds collapsed.
Fidelity Investments, the world's biggest mutual fund company,
owned $2.3 billion in CDO-issued commercial paper in two money
market funds as of May 31, according to spokeswoman Sophie
Launay. The biggest money market fund in the U.S., Fidelity Cash
Reserves Fund, had 1.5 percent of its $98.2 billion assets
invested in CDO commercial paper backed by subprime debt.
The Fidelity Institutional Money Market Portfolio had 2.3
percent of its $32.3 billion in assets in such commercial paper.
Boston-based Fidelity fund manager Kim Miller says he's holding
off on buying more CDO debt.
"There's been a lot of volatility," he says. "I think people are
waiting for the dust to settle, and we're doing the same."
Money market managers are required to determine that their
investments are safe and have high credit ratings, according to
Rule 2a-7, a 1997 addition to the Investment Company Act of
1940.
"The money market fund shall limit its portfolio investments to
those United States dollar-denominated securities that the
fund's board of directors determines present minimal credit
risks," the rule says.
Money market managers buy CDO commercial paper to boost returns
and make their fund more attractive to investors, which in turn
increases their income, money market fund inventor Bent says.
"The higher rates sell more easily," he says. "They're doing it
to suck the people in."
Fund managers are paid based on the total dollar amount invested
in their funds, so more assets mean higher pay for managers.
"Trying to outguess the market makes no sense at all," Bent says
about money market funds. "That's not the risk you're looking
for."
The subprime-backed commercial paper in money market funds
offers some of the highest yields managers can include in their
investments because such funds are prohibited by SEC rules from
buying junk-rated debt.
The Bear Stearns hedge fund implosion demonstrated how
misleading credit ratings of CDOs can be. The two funds had
avoided buying the riskiest CDOs, sticking with tranches awarded
AAA and AA grades, or the highest available, from Fitch, Moody's
and S&P.
In July, the funds filed for bankruptcy protection as the
investment bank halted withdrawals from a third fund, Bear
Stearns Asset-Backed Securities Fund, after investors sought to
extract their money.
Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master
Fund Ltd. and Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit
Strategies Enhanced Leverage Master Fund Ltd. lost a combined
total of about $1.5 billion in the second quarter as home prices
slumped and subprime loan foreclosures jumped 62 percent from a
year earlier because borrowers stopped making mortgage payments.
Cioffi had total control of Bear Stearns CDOs, according to a
Fitch report dated Aug. 3."In lieu of a formal committee
process, ultimate decision making lies with Ralph Cioffi," Fitch
wrote.
Cioffi joined the bank as a bond salesman in 1985, seven years
after earning a bachelor's degree in business administration at
Saint Michael's College in Colchester, Vermont. Apart from his
job managing funds, Cioffi also ran the Klio and High-Grade
Structured Credit CDOs, which are rated mostly AAA.
AIM, Putnam, Wells Fargo and other fund managers bought more
than $4 billion of Klio and High-Grade commercial paper backed
by subprime home loans.
In June, the three Klio CDOs held 37-41 percent in subprime
mortgage securities, according to trustee reports. The original
$5 billion in collateral for Klio II's CDOs, purchased in 2004
and 2005, came from a source very close to home: Cioffi's own
High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund.
AIM's Liquid Assets Portfolio held almost $900 million in Klio
commercial paper on May 31, SEC filings show. Putnam Money
Market Fund owned $119 million of Cioffi-managed paper on March
31, amounting to 3.5 percent of the Putnam fund's $3.41 billion
in holdings.
"By investing in high-quality, short-term money market
instruments for which there are deep and liquid markets, the
fund's risk of losing principal is very low," Putnam wrote in
its first-quarter report to shareholders.
"Putnam Money Market Fund holds a much smaller amount of CDOs
than it did in March," Putnam spokeswoman Laura McNamara says.
"Putnam is comfortable with the structures we currently own."
Seven money market funds run by Federated Investors Inc., the
third-largest U.S. manager of money market funds, owned more
than $1 billion of commercial paper issued by Bear Stearns-
managed CDOs at the end of June, according to Federated's Web
Site.
"We were never real comfortable with the whole program to begin
with," says Deborah Cunningham, chief investment officer of
Pittsburgh-based Federated's money market funds. "We wanted to
monitor it more and keep a little tighter rein on it."
She says that's why Federated has never held Klio paper for more
than 90 days.
Bank of America's Columbia Cash Reserves and Columbia Money
Market Reserves funds owned more than $600 million of Bear
Stearns's Klio CDO paper on June 30, according to Boston-based
Columbia Management, the investment division of Bank of America,
which is based in Charlotte, North Carolina.
"The funds are permitted to invest in asset-backed securities,"
Bank of America spokeswoman Faith Yando says.
Three Wells Fargo money market funds held $886 million in Bear
Stearns-managed CDO commercial paper on June 30. The funds held
a total of $1.5 billion in CDO commercial paper on that day,
according to Wells Fargo spokesman John Roehm.
The Wells Fargo Advantage, Advantage Cash Investment and
Advantage Liquidity Reserve funds held the subprime-backed debt.
The funds' holdings of all CDO commercial paper ranged from 4.1
percent to 6.9 percent of their assets, Roehm says.
Wells Fargo trimmed its money market funds' CDO holdings to $680
million by July 31, Roehm says. He declined to comment further.
Wells Fargo money market funds also held more than $120 million
of commercial paper issued by CDOs managed by Deerfield Capital
Management on June 30. That CDO firm was controlled by
billionaire Peltz, 65, who owns the Arby's fast-food chain and
sold Snapple Beverage Corp. to Cadbury Schweppes Plc for $1.45
billion in 2000.
Peltz agreed on April 20 to sell Deerfield to an affiliate,
Deerfield Triarc Capital Corp., a publicly traded real estate
investment trust with no employees, for $290 million, SEC
filings show.
Deerfield Triarc hired Bear Stearns in March for $2.4 million to
provide a so-called fairness opinion, which concluded that the
acquisition price was acceptable. Bear Stearns spokesman Sherman
declined to comment on the fairness opinion.
Deerfield Triarc disclosed in a July 13 regulatory filing that
the SEC was conducting an informal inquiry into collateralized
mortgage obligations and had made two information requests to
Deerfield as part of its probe.
That filing was made more than two months after Triarc announced
the sale of Deerfield Capital Management. Triarc noted the
federal probe on page 21 of the filing as part of a list of
risks for investors.
Peltz didn't respond to e-mail and telephone requests for
comment.
Commercial paper from CDOs, laced with subprime home loan
securitizations, made up 5.1 percent of the $11.4 billion Wells
Fargo Advantage Money Market Fund as of June 30. The holdings
included $96 million of Buckingham CDOs.
Morgan Stanley money market funds held more than $330 million of
Deerfield's Buckingham commercial paper on June 30, according to
the bank's Web site. Credit Suisse money market funds owned more
than $700 million in April, according to SEC filings.
The Morgan Stanley Institutional Liquidity Funds Prime Portfolio
held $235 million of Buckingham commercial paper on June 30.
Morgan Stanley spokesman Lake declined to comment.
Deerfield's CDO track record isn't reassuring. Since 2000, six
of the 14 CDOs Deerfield manages have had tranches downgraded
from investment grade to junk. Valeo Investment Grade I and II,
Mid Ocean 2000 and 2001, Ocean View and North Lake include
sections that lost their investment-grade ratings.
In May, Fitch said 39 percent of Mid Ocean CDO collateral was
distressed, and it expected all of a $44 million Mid Ocean
tranche to be a total loss. Moody's still rates Mid Ocean
investment grade, or Baa3, one notch above junk.
Deerfield Capital Senior Managing Director John Brinckerhoff and
Bear Stearns spokesman Sherman declined to comment.
While CDOs aren't regulated by the SEC, mutual funds --including
money markets -- are. The SEC disclosed in June it's begun
looking at some CDO investments, without releasing further
details.
Former SEC Chief Accountant Turner says investors have cause to
be concerned about money market funds' holding subprime debt."It
doesn't make you feel real good in the gut," Turner says. "This
stuff takes on a life of its own when it starts going south."
Investors are accustomed to treating money market funds as if
they were bank savings accounts. The last thing they expect is
that the subprime debt turmoil would enter their safe cash
havens. And now it has.